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Abstract 
Schepers, H. and J. Hooman, A trace-based compositional proof theory for fault tolerant distributed 
systems, Theoretical Computer Science 128 (1994) 127-157. 
We present a compositional network proof theory to specify and verify safety properties of fault 
tolerant distributed systems. We abstract from the precise nature and occurrence offaults, but model 
their effect on the externally visible input and output behaviour. To this end a failure hypothesis is 
formalized as a relation between the normal behaviour (i.e. the behaviour when no faults occur) of 
a system and its acceptable behaviour, that is, the normal behaviour together with the exceptional 
behaviour (i.e. the behaviour whose abnormality should be tolerated). The method is compositional 
to allow reasoning with the specifications of processes while ignoring their implementation details. 
A compositional formalism to reason about the normal behaviour is extended with a single rule by 
which a specification of the acceptable behaviour can be obtained from the specification of the 
normal behaviour and a predicate characterizing the failure hypothesis. Soundness and relative 
network completeness are proved. Our approach is illustrated by applying it to a triple modular 
redundant system and the alternating bit protocol. 
1. Introduction 
It is difficult to prove the properties of a distributed system composed of failure 
prone processes, as such proofs must take into account the effects of faults occurring 
at any point in the execution of the individual processes. In the Hoare style formalism 
of [7] Cristian deals with the effects of faults that have occurred by partitioning the 
initial state space into disjoint subspaces, and providing a separate specification for 
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each part. In the formalisms that have been proposed in the more recent literature to 
deal with the occurrence of faults during execution (cf. [S, 12,13,17,20,27]) the 
occurrence of a fault is modelled explicitly. In contrast, we want to model the effects of 
faults on the externally visible input and output behaviour and let the syntactic 
interface of a process remain unchanged. For instance, we do not separate the 
observable actions generated by the regular execution of the program from those that 
are attributed to faults. The incorporation of a recovery algorithm into a program has 
been investigated in [16,19]. There, the occurrence of a fault is again modelled 
explicitly and causes the program to enter an erroneous state. Once in an erroneous 
state the program may exhibit arbitrary behaviour and this distinction suffices in case 
of recovery. To allow a general treatment of paradigms for fault tolerance [22] we 
prefer to reason with more nuance about the effects of faults. 
To support top-down program design we wish to reason with the specifications of 
processes without considering their implementation and the precise nature and 
occurrence of faults in such an implementation. This means that we aim at a composi- 
tional proof theory for fault tolerant distributed systems. In particular, we focus on the 
formalization of fault tolerance in relation to concurrency. Therefore, we abstract 
from the internal states of processes and concentrate on the input and output 
behaviour that is observable at their interface. Especially, we only describe the 
sequence of communications that are performed by the processes. We do not consider 
the timing of those communications and the enabledness of a process to communicate 
(so we do not reason about deadlock). In our proof theory we do not deal with the 
sequential aspects of processes and instead use a simple compositional formalism to 
verify properties of networks of processes. 
Our framework is restricted to the specification and verification of safety properties 
of fault tolerant distributed systems. Safety properties are important for reliability 
because, in the characterization by Lamport [ 143, they express that “nothing bad will 
happen”. Consider, for instance, a simple l-place first-in first-out buffer B that has two 
observable channels in and out, with the obvious interpretation. Typical safety 
properties of B are “if there is a communication on out then the communicated value is 
equal to the most recently communicated value on in” and “the number of out 
communications is equal to, or one less than, the number of in communications”. 
Since we abstract from the sequential details of programs, termination and divergence 
are not observable in our framework. Because we do not consider liveness properties, 
no fairness assumptions are needed. 
In fault tolerant systems, three forms of behaviour are distinguished: normal, 
exceptional and catastrophic [15]. Normal behaviour is the behaviour when no faults 
occur. The discriminating factor between exceptional and catastrophic behaviour is 
thefailure hypothesis which stipulates how faults affect the normal behaviour. Relative 
to the failure hypothesis an exceptional behaviour exhibits an abnormality which 
should be tolerated. A catastrophic behaviour has an abnormality that was not 
anticipated (cf. [2,15,2 11). In general, the catastrophic behaviour of a component 
cannot be tolerated by a system. Under a particular failure hypothesis for each of its 
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components, a system is designed to tolerate (only) the anticipated component failures 
(see e.g. [22] for some design examples). The exceptional behaviour together with the 
normal behaviour constitutes the acceptable behaviour. 
Given this classification of behaviour, we investigate whether an existing composi- 
tional proof theory for reasoning about the normal behaviour of a system can be 
adapted to deal with its acceptable behaviour. To do so, we formalize a failure 
hypothesis as a relation between the normal and the acceptable behaviour of a system. 
Indeed, such a relation enables one to abstract from the precise nature and occurrence 
of a fault and to focus on any abnormal behaviour it causes. It is important to note 
that our goal is to examine whether it is possible to develop a compositional proof 
theory based on the idea of transforming behaviours; for the time being it is not our 
aim to find a logic to express failure hypotheses as elegantly as possible. 
We consider networks of processes that communicate synchronously via directed 
channels. Processes do not share variables. We express a property of a process P by 
means of a first-order trace logic, using a special variable h to denote the trace, also 
called history, of P. Such a history describes the observable behaviour of a process by 
recording the communications along the visible channels of the process. For instance, 
a possible history of buffer B is ((in, l), (out, l), (in, 3) (out, 3)). To express that a pro- 
cess P satisfies a safety property 4 we use a correctness formula of the form Psat 4. 
Based on a particular failure hypothesis, the set of behaviours that characterize 
a process is expanded. To keep such an expansion manageable, the failure hypothesis 
of a process P is formalized as a predicate, whose only free variables are h and hold, 
which represents a relation between the normal and acceptable histories of P. The 
interpretation is such that hoid represents a normal history of process P, whereas h is 
an acceptable history of P with respect o the failure hypothesis under discussion. For 
a predicate x representing a failure hypothesis, we introduce the construct P{x to 
indicate execution of process P under the assumption of x. This construct enables one 
to specify failure prone processes. Consider again buffer B. Under the hypothesis that, 
due to faults, values in the buffer are corrupted, which is formalized by some failure 
hypothesis predicate Car, the history ((in, l), (out, l), (in, 3), (out, 3)) may be trans- 
formed into the history ((in, l), (out, l), (in, 3), (out, 5) >. Then, we would like to prove 
that failure prone process B<Cor still satisfies the property that “the number of out 
communications is equal to, or one less than, the number of in communications”. 
We define the trace semantics of a failure prone process FP, and define when 
correctness formulae of the form FPsat 4 are valid. We present a proof theory to 
verify that a system tolerates the exceptional behaviour of its components to the 
desired extent. The proof theory is compositional in the sense that it allows reasoning 
with the specifications atisfied by failure prone processes while ignoring their imple- 
mentation details. Further, our approach supports a modular treatment of normal 
and acceptable behaviour. The usefulness of our method is illustrated by applying it to 
a triple modular redundant system and the alternating bit protocol, where, indeed, we 
only use the specifications of the components. Finally, we show that our proof theory 
is sound and obtain a completeness result by establishing preciseness preservation [28]. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model 
of computation. In Section 3 we present the assertion language and associated 
correctness formulae. In Section 4 we incorporate failure hypotheses into our formal- 
ism. Section 5 presents a compositional network proof theory for fault tolerant 
distributed systems. We illustrate our method by applying it, in Section 6, to a triple 
modular redundant system, and, in Section 7, to the alternating bit protocol. In 
Section 8 we prove that the proof theory of Section 5 is sound and complete. The 
conclusions and suggestions for future research can be found in Section 9. An 
extended abstract of this paper appeared in [25]. 
2. Model of computation 
Let I/AR be a nonempty set of program variables, CHAN a nonempty set of 
channel names, and let VAL be a denumerable domain of values. N denotes the set of 
natural numbers (including 0). We assume a programming language, such as CSP [9] 
or occam [l 11, which can be used to define networks of processes that communicate 
synchronously via directed channels. Besides sequential constructs, this language 
includes the construct P1 I/ P, to indicate parallel execution of processes PI and PZ, as 
well as the construct P\ cset to hide the channels from a set cset of internal channels. 
Define var(P) as the set of variables occurring in process P. We do not allow 
parallel processes to share program variables. 
l For PI /j P2 we require that ~ar(P,)nuar(P~)=$?~ 
The set of visible, or observable, input channels of process P, notation in(P), can be 
defined for sequential constructs. Then, in(P, I/ P2) = in(Pl)uin(P2) and in(P\cset) = 
in(P)-met. The set out(P) of observable output channels of process P is defined 
likewise. 
Definition 2.1 (Observable channels of a process). The set of observable channels of 
a process P, notation than(P), is defined by than(P) = in(P)uout(P). 
To guarantee that channels are unidirectional and point-to-point, we have the 
following syntactic constraint: 
l For PI /I P2 we require that in(Pl)nin(P2)=0 and out(Pl)nout(Pz)=@ 
To guarantee that only internal channels are hidden, we have the following: 
l For P\cset we require that cset cin(P)nout(P). 
We represent a synchronous communication of value ALE VAL along channel 
CE CHAN by a record (c, /*), and define ch( (c, p)) = c and ual( (c, ,u)) = p. To denote the 
behaviour of a process P we use a history H which is a finite sequence (also called 
a trace) of the form ((cl,pl), . . . . (c,,~,,)) of length len(d)=n, where nEN, ciEchan(P) 
and ail VAL for 1 <i< n. Such a history denotes the communications of P along 
its observable channels up to some point in an execution. Let ( ) denote the empty 
trace, i.e. the sequence of length 0. The concatenation of two traces 
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Ql=((c1,PlL ...T (ck,d) and Qz=(@I,v~),..., (d, , v~)), denoted d,^ Q2, is defined as 
<(Ci,Pi), ..*3 (ck,pk),(dl,vl), . . . . (d,,v,)). We use B^(c,p) as an abbreviation of 
f9^ ((GP)). 
Definition 2.2 (Traces). Let TRACE be the set of traces, i.e. the smallest set such that 
l ( ) ETRACE, 
l if 0~ TRACE, ceCHAN and ,~LE VAL then 8” (c,~)ETRACE. 
Definition 2.3 (Projection). For a trace BETRACE and a set of channels cset c CHAN, 
we define the projection of 8 onto met, denoted by Btcset, as the sequence obtained 
from 8 by deleting all records with channels not in met. Formally, 
0 if 9=( ), 
0 r cset = e. r cset if f?=S,^ (c,~) and c$cset, 
(B,,tcset)*(c,p) if O=O,^(c,p) and cccset. 
Definition 2.4 (Hiding). Hiding is the complement of projection. Formally, the hiding 
of a set cset of channels from a trace t3eTRACE, notation B\cset, is defined as 
8\cset=Bt(CHAN-cset). 
Definition 2.5 (Channels occurring in a trace). The set of channels occurring in a trace 9, 
notation chan(@, is defined by 
chan(8)=(c~CHAN)8t{c}#( >}. 
Notice that Btcset=8 iff chan(8)zcset, and that O?(c)={ ) iff c$chan(Q). 
Definition 2.6 (Length ofa trace). The length of a trace 8, denoted by /en(e), is defined 
by 
0 len(( ))=O, 
0 len(O^(c,~))=len(B)+ 1. 
Definition 2.7 (Prejix). The trace 8, is a prejix of a trace 02, notation O1 iBz, iff there 
exists a trace 0, such that 8~0, =8,. 
A set of traces is pre$x closed if every prefix of a trace in the set is also an element of 
that set. For a process P defined using a programming language in which processes 
communicate synchronously via directed channels it is quite standard, using the 
above-defined operations, to give the prefix closed set #[PI of possible finite traces 
that can be observed up to any point in an execution of P (see, for instance, [26,29]). 
For infinite executions of P the set 2 [PlJ contains all finite approximations, which is 
justified since we only deal with safety properties [29]. The set X[P] represents the 
normal behaviour of process P. In Section 4 we determine the set &“[PixJ representing 
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the acceptable behaviour of P under the assumption of failure hypothesis x, i.e. the 
normal behaviour of failure prone process Plx. 
3. Assertion language and correctness formulae 
As mentioned before, we use a correctness formula P sat d, to express that process 
P satisfies safety property 4. Informally, since we abstract from the internal states of 
the processes and focus on the pattern of communications, such a correctness formula 
expresses that any sequence of communications P may exhibit satisfies 4. 
Similar to the semantic denotation of traces in the previous section, we use 
communication record expressions such as (c,~), with ceCHAN and PE VAL, in 
assertions. We have channel expressions, e.g. using the operator ch which yields the 
channel of a communication record, and value expressions, including the operator vu1 
which yields the value of a communication record and the length operator len. 
Further, we use in assertions the empty trace, ( ), traces of one record, e.g. ((c, p)), as 
well as the concatenation operator A and the projection operator r. To refer to the 
communication history of a process we use a special variable h. For instance, a 
process which outputs value 2 along channel c satisfies the assertion hl {c} = 
< >vh~{c}=((c>2)). T o reason about natural numbers, the assertion language 
includes, for value expression vexp, the predicate vexpEN which is true if and only if 
the value of vexp is a natural number. Henceforth we use variables i,j, k, 1, n that range 
over N. We use, for instance, V i: 4 as an abbreviation of V i: ie N -4. Let VI/AR, with 
typical representative G‘, denote the set of logical value variables ranging over I/AL, 
and let TVAR, with characteristic element t, be the set of logical trace variables 
ranging over TRACE. Assume that VVARnTVAR =$?I. 
Table 1 presents the assertion language, with CECHAN, ,uEVAL, wVVAR, 
TV TVAR, and cset E CHAN. Observe that an expression in the assertion language of 
Table 1 does not refer to program variables since we abstract from the internal state of 
a process in this paper. 
Definition 3.1 (Abbreviations). Henceforth we use the following abbreviations, where 
= denotes syntactic equality: 
0 ch(cexp, uexp) = ch((cexp, vexp)) 
0 val(cexp, vexp) 3 val((cexp, vexp)) 
Table 1 
Syntax of the assertion language 
Channel expression 
Value expression 
Record expression 
Trace expression 
Assertion 
cexp ::= c 1 ch(rexp) 
vexp ::= p ( I’ 1 ual(rexp) ( len(texp) 
rexp ::= (cexp,uexp) ( texp(uexp) 
texp ::= t ( h 1 ( ) 1 (rexp) 1 cexp,^texp, 1 texptcset 
4 ::= cexp,=cexp, 1 vexp,=vexpz I uexpGN I texp,=texp, l 
$1 Ad, I 14 I 3c: 4 I It: 4 
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l texp T cexp = texp t { cexp > 
0 rexp, =rexp2 E ch(rexp,)=ch(rexp2) A val(rexpl)=ual(rexp,) 
l texp\cset = texpr(CHAN-cset) 
0 lust(texp)r texp(len(texp)) 
0 texp15texp2 = 3: texp; t= texp2 
This expresses that trace texp, is a prefix of trace texp2. 
0 texpl 5” texp, = 3: len(t)<n A texp; t = texp2 
to assert that trace texp, is a prefix of trace texp2 which is at most n records shorter; 
l texp,<texp2 = texp15texp2 A texp, #texp2 
to denote that trace texp, is a strict prefix of trace texp2; 
0 texp, <ntexp2 = 3: l<len(t)<n A texp;‘t=texpz 
to express that trace texp, is a strict prefix of trace texp, which is at most PI records 
shorter; 
0 texp[vexp]= texp(l)^...^texp(vexp) 
to refer to the prefix of trace texp that has length uexp; 
len (t) = len(texp 1 ) 
0 texpI_atexp2=3t: AVi: 1 <i<len(t)-+ val(t(i))<uul(t(i+l)) 
i 
A Vi: 1 di<len(t) + texpz(uul(t(i)))=texp,(i) 
to denote that trace texp, is a (not necessarily contiguous) subsequence of trace texp,. 
Furthermore, we use the standard abbreviations 4r V $2 =T(T 41 A1 42) and 
C#J~ +jz ET C#I 1 V c#I~. Also, for natural numbers x and y, we use the relations x <” y 
and x <" y to denote that 0 d y - x < II and 0 < y-x d n, respectively. 
Definition 3.2 (Sequence of values). For a trace texp, 
Vul(texp) = 
i 
0 if texp=( ), 
Vul(texp,)^u if texp= texp: (c, u). 
Example 3.3 (Medium). Consider a medium M that accepts messages via min and 
delivers them via mout in first-in first-out order. To specify that M has a capacity of one 
message, we use 
M sat Vul(h T m out) 5’ Val(hfmin), 
For an assertion 4 we define the set chun(4) of channels uch that cechan(4) if and 
only if a communication along c might affect the validity of 4. For instance, the 
validity of assertion h = ( ) is affected by any communication and thus we should 
have chun(h=( ))=CHAN. On the other hand, the validity of assertion 
(htjc})^(d,7)=((d,7)) can only be changed by a communication along channel c, 
although d also occurs in the assertion. Hence, chun(q5) consists of the channels to 
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which references to h in 4 are restricted rather than the channels occurring syntacti- 
cally in C#J (cf. [lo, 291). Note that the value of a logical variable is not affected by any 
communication. 
Definition 3.4 (History channels in an assertion). For an assertion C$ we inductively 
define the set than(4) as the smallest set of channels such that the validity of C#J may 
only be affected by communications on the channels of than(4). We only give the 
most interesting cases of this definition; the rest can easily be defined by structural 
induction (see [26]): 
l chan(c)=chan(p)=chan(u)=chan(t)=chan(( ))=$, 
l chun(h)= CHAN, 
l chan(texp lcset) = chan(texp) n cset. 
Next we define the meaning of assertions. We use an environment y to interpret the 
logical variables of VVARuTVAR. This environment maps a logical value variable 
u to a value Y(v)EI/AL, and a logical trace variable t to a trace y(t)ETRACE. An 
assertion is interpreted with respect to a pair (0, y), where the value of h is obtained 
from 8. We use the special symbol ,j’ to deal with the interpretation of texp(uexp) 
where index oexp is not a positive natural number, or, if it is, is greater than the length 
of texp. The value of an expression is undefined whenever a subexpression yields #. 
We define the value of a channel expression cexp in the trace 8, and an environment y, 
denoted by %?[cexp](B, y), yielding a value in CHANu {,j’}, the value of a value 
expression uexp in the trace 0, and an environment y, denoted by V[uexpJ (0, ?;), 
yielding a value in VAL u { ,+‘I, the value of a record expression rexp in the trace 8, and 
environment y, 
;kZAN x VAL)u{I(), 
denoted by .%! [rexp] (6, y), yielding a value in 
and the value of a trace expression texp for trace 8, and an 
environment y, denoted by Y [texpj (f3, ‘J), yielding a value in TRACE u {X>. We give 
a few cases of these definitions (the full interpretation can be found in [26]): 
( (c, p) iff th ere exist 6, and t32 such that 
0 B[texp(uexp)](Q,;,)= 
Ien(8,)=Y[uexp](fI,y)-1 and 
~~texpn(e,y)=81^(~,~)^82, 
otherwise, 
Definition 3.5 (Variant of an environment). The uariant of an environment y with 
respect to a logical variable u (either in VVAR or TVAR) and a u (resp. in VAL or 
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TRACE), denoted (y : U-V), is given by 
(y:zHu)(w)= v 
i 
if w3u, 
y(w) if W$U. 
Let (8, y) )= qb denote that assertion 4 holds for trace % and environment y. To avoid 
the complexity of a three-valued logic, an equality predicate is interpreted strictly with 
respect o j”, i.e. it is false if it contains some expression that has an undefined value. 
A few typical cases are: 
l (%,y)I=texp1=texp2iff~~texp1a(%,y)=~-[rtexp,n(%,y)and~~~exp,4(%,y)#I(, 
l (%,Y)/=~~A~z i~(~,y)l=~l and (%,y)I=d2, 
l (%,~)I=ib iffnot (Q,Y)i=4, 
l (0, y) + 31: 4 iff there exists a value ,U such that (%,(y : u-p)) /= 4, 
l (%, y) + 3: c$ iff there exists a value 6 such that (%,(y : tw6)) +q5. 
Definition 3.6 (Validity of an assertion). An assertion 4 is valid, which we denote by 
I=$, iff, for all 8 and “I’, (%,y) I=+. 
We conclude this section by defining when a correctness formula Psat 4 is valid. 
Definition 3.7 (Validity of a correctness formula). For a process P and an assertion 
4 a correctness formula Psat 4 is valid, denoted by j= Psat 4, iff, for all y and all 
%E*Ipsj, (%,Y)!=dJ. 
4. Incorporating failure hypotheses 
As mentioned in the introduction, a failure hypothesis x of a process P is formalized 
as a predicate which represents arelation between the normal and acceptable histories 
of P. Such a predicate is expressed in a slightly extended version of the assertion 
language. This version contains, besides h, the special variable hold. As in the previous 
section, variable h describes the observable behaviour of a program, but now this 
behaviour might be affected by faults. So, h represents an acceptable history of process 
P, whereas ho,,, represents a normal history of P. For instance, a possible history of 
process Square, which alternately inputs an integer via the observable channel in and 
outputs its square via the observable channel out, is ((in, l), (out, l), (in, 3), (out, 9)). 
Consider the exceptional behaviour caused by Square’s output channel transiently 
being stuck at zero. The relation between the normal and the acceptable behaviour 
can be defined using a predicate StuckAtZero asserting that 
l with respect o the number of recorded in and out communications hold and h are 
equally long, 
l the order of in and out communications as recorded by hold is preserved by h, 
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l the ith input value as recorded by h equals the ith input value as recorded by hold, 
and 
l the ith output value as recorded by h equals the ith output value as recorded by 
h old 2 or it is equal to zero. 
As in [23], the construct Square\StuckAtZero indicates execution of process Square 
under failure hypothesis StuckAtzero. Since StuckAtZero holds for h = hold = ((in, l), 
(out, l), (in, 3), (out, 9)), we have that Square’s normal behaviour ((in, l), (out, l), 
(in, 3), (out, 9)) is contained in &? [Square) StuckAtZero], the set representing the 
acceptable behaviour of Square under StuckAtZero. Also, because StuckAtZero holds 
for h = ((in, l), (out, l),(in, 3), (out, 0)) and hold = <(in, I), (our, I), (ifi, 3), (out, 9)), we 
obtain that the abnormal behaviour ((in, I), (out, l), (in, 3), (out, 0)) is an element of 
%‘[Square)StuckAtZero]. 
Example 4.1 (Stuck at zero). The above-mentioned predicate StuckAtZero can for- 
mally be defined as follows: 
StuckAtZero=len(h,,dr{ in, outj)=len(hT{in,out~) 
AVi: 1 Gidlen(hT{in,outJ) + ch(hT{in,out}(i)) 
= Ch(h,,,f{in,Out)(i)) 
AV’i: 1 <idlen(hTin) + aal(hTin(i))=d(h,,,tin(i)) 
A Vi: 1 bidlen(htout) + val(hrout(i))=val(h,,,tout(i)) 
Vual(htout(i))=O. 
By not specifying the value part of an out record in h, allowing it to be any element 
of VAL, we can formalize corruption. 
Example 4.2 (Corruption). We formalize corruption as follows: 
Cor E len(h,,,t {in, out I)= len(hr {in, out 1) 
AVi: l<iblen(hT{in,out})+ch(hT{in,out}(i)) 
=ch(h,,,t{in,out}(i)) 
AVi: 1 <i<len(h~in)+ual(hfin(i))=ual(h,,dfin(i)). 
Example 4.3 (Loss). Consider medium M of Example 3.3. To formalize the hypothesis 
that M may lose messages we define 
LOSS~hT(min,m.“,jah.,dT(min,mout} 
AhTmin=holdfmin. 
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We extend the assertion language with trace expression term hold. Sentences of the 
extended language are called transformation expressions, with typical representative Ic/. 
For a transformation expression (I/ we also write $(&id, h) to indicate that $ has two 
free variables hold and h. We use $(texp,, texp,) to denote the expression which is 
obtained from $ by replacing ho,,, by texp,, and h by texp2. A transformation 
expression is interpreted with respect o a triple ((I,, 8, y). The value of hoid is obtained 
from trace 00, and, as in Section 3, h corresponds to trace 8, and environment 
y interprets the logical variables of VVARuTVAR. The meaning of assertions, as 
defined in Section 3, can easily be adapted for transformation expressions; the only 
new clause is 
0 ~~holdn(eO,e,y)=eO. 
The set of history channels of a transformation expression $, notation than (II/) is 
defined as in Definition 3.4 with the extra clause 
l chan( hold) = CHAN. 
Since the term hold does not occur in assertions, the following lemma is trivial. 
Lemma 4.4 (Correspondence). For assertion 4, for all BO, (O,, 8, y) I= 4 @((e, y) + $. 
Definition 4.5 (Failure hypothesis). A failure hypothesis x is a transformation expres- 
sion which, to guarantee that the normal behaviour is part of the acceptable behavi- 
our, represents a reflexive relation on the normal behaviour: 
. k xhi, 9 ho,d 1. 
As mentioned before, the semantics of a process contains the finite traces that can be 
observed up to any point in a normal execution. To maintain this property for 
acceptable behaviour, we require a failure hypothesis x to preserve the prefix 
closedness: 
l k(&,,d, h) A r<:h)-+3ro,diho,d: x(&a, t). 
Furthermore, a failure hypothesis for a process FP does not impose restrictions on 
communications along those channels that are not in chan(FP): 
l chan( x) c chan(FP). 
Using P to denote a process expressed in the programming language mentioned in 
Section 2, we define the syntax of our extended programming language in Table 2. 
In FP?x, we have, by Definition 4.5, that chan(x)Gchan(FP). Hence, 
chan(FP{x)=chan(FP). As before, chan(FP, )( FP2)=chan(FPl)uchan(FP,), and 
chan(FP\cset)=chan(FP)-cset. 
Table 2 
Extended syntax of the programming language 
Failure prone process FP ::= P ( FP, ilFP2 ( FP\cset ( FP<x 
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Since we are only interested in the traces of a process, the semantics of a failure 
prone process FP is inductively defined as follows: 
l ~BFP,I(FP,a={sIfori=1,2,8tchan(FPi)~~X~Pin,and8fchan(FP,(/ FPz)=G>, 
0 Z?iFP\csetl] = jO\cset ( tkX[FP] >, 
l X[FPlX]= (G /there exists a B,E%‘[FP] such that, for all y, (B,,B,y) 1=x, and 
Observe that the semantics is defined such that if &z’[FP] then ckan(O)E;ckan(FP). 
Notice that, for process FP, failure hypothesis xFP E h 1 ckan(FP) = hoId 7 ckan(FP) 
serves as an identity relation, i.e. 9’1 FP] = X [ FP 2~~~1. Also, note that, because of 
the reflexivity of x on the traces of X[FPj, H[FP] cX’[FP)XJ. 
Lemma 4.6 (Prefix closedness). Ifee2[FP] and 650 then ~EX[FP]. 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Definition 4.7 (Composite transformation expression). For transformation expressions 
I+!J 1 and I/I~, the composite transformation expression $ 1 <II, 2 is defined as follows: 
$1111/2=3r: $r(hord,r)A$z(r>h)> 
where t must be fresh. 
From this definition we easily obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 4.8 (Composite failure hypothesis). 
~“(IFP)(X1~112)a=~~(FP~x1)~x2n. 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
The following lemmas are easy to prove by structural induction. 
Lemma 4.9 (Projection). Consider cset G CHAN and transformation expression $. If 
ckan($)Ecset then, for all &, 8 and y, 
(4 (e,,mk=~ ifSVWtcw4=~~ 
(b) (e,, 6~) I= $ ~$fff(b tcm 8,~) I=$. 
Lemma 4.10 (Substitution). Consider transformation expression $(kold, k): 
(4 (e,,e,?i)~~(kold,texp) ifS(e,,~~texpU(eO,e,y),y)l=~(k,ld,k), 
(b) (LQ,~)l=$(texp,k) ijfS(~Utexpa(e,,e,~),e,y),e,y)~~(k,,,,k). 
Since the interpretation of assertions has not changed, the validity of correctness 
formula FPsat 4 is defined as Definition 3.7, with P replaced by FP. 
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In this section we present a compositional proof theory to prove safety properties of 
networks of processes. Since we focus on the relation between fault tolerance and 
concurrency, we have abstracted from the internal states of the processes and do not 
give rules for atomic statements, nor sequential composition. Such rules could be 
formulated by using an extended assertion language which includes program vari- 
ables and a denotation to indicate termination (e.g. [29]). 
Rule 5.1 (Consequence). 
Rule 5.2 (Conjunction). 
FPsatd,. FPsataS, 
FPsat4, A4, . 
Rule 5.3 (Invariance). 
csetnchan(FP)=#l 
FPsathrcset=( )’ 
From this rule we obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.4 (Invariance). 
FPsath\chan(FP)=( ). 
Rule 5.5 (Parallel composition). 
FP,sat41, FP,sat+, 
FP1 lIFP2sat41 A42 
provided that chan(q51)nchan(FP2)~chan(FP,) and chan(q52)nchan(FP,)cchan 
(FP,), i.e. if the assertion that holds for one process refers to channels of the other 
process then this concerns channels connecting the two processes (cf. [lo, 291). Note 
that, as a consequence of this restriction, any occurrence of h in specification c$~ of 
process FPi should be projected onto a subset of chan(FPi). Recall that we do not 
allow shared variables. 
Rule 5.6 (Hiding). 
FPsat 4, chan( 4)ncset = fj 
FP\csetsat 4 ’ 
Finally, we formulate the rule for the introduction of a failure hypothesis. 
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Rule 5.7 (Failure hypothesis introduction). 
FP sat C#I 
WXsaWX’ 
Observe that, since 4 is an assertion, hold does not occur in 4, and hence 4 j x is also an 
assertion. 
Example 5.8 (Loss). Consider the medium of Example 4.3. 
introduction), 
M2Losssat3t: (Vul(hTm,,,) 5’ VUl(hTmi,))[t/h] 
A(hT{min,mmr)gh,~T (min,m,,r) 
r\h~min=holdtmin)Ct/h,,,l, 
which reduces to 
MlLosssatSt: (V’d(tTm,,,)<’ vU[(ttmin) 
By (Failure hypothesis 
Now, for instance, by ht{mi,,m,,,}g tT {min,m,,,), we have, obviously, htm,,, 
9 tfm,,,, which, since Val(trm,,,) 3 ’ Val(ttmi,), implies Vul(hpm,,,)S P’al(ttmi,). 
Then, by t rmin = hT min, we obtain 
M{Losssat Val(hTm,,,)a VUl(hTmin). 
Also, by Vul(t~m,,,)il Val(tTmi,), we have Vi: ch(t’(i))= moUt-+uul(t’(i))= 
uu[(last(t’[i]Tmi,)), with t’=tt (min,m,,,}. Because hr (min,m,,,}a tT {m;,,,m,,,} 
whilst hf m, = t t min, this leads to 
MlLosssatVi: ch(ht{min,mout}(i))=mout 
~va[(ht{mi,,m,,,)(i))=uul(lust(h T {min,moU,) Gil Tmill)). 
6. Example I: triple modular redundancy 
Consider the triple modular redundant system of Fig. 1. It consists of three identical 
components Cj,j = 1,2,3, an input triplicating component In, and a component Voter 
that determines the ultimate output. The intuition of the triple modular redundancy 
paradigm is that three identical components operate on the same input and send their 
output to a voter which outputs the result of a majority vote. Clearly, the failure of one 
component can be masked, and the failure of two or all three components can be 
detected, as long as they do not fail identically. 
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Fig. 1. Triple modular redundant system 
Definition 6.1 (Abbreviations). Throughout this section we use the following abbrevi- 
ations: 
0 c(i)=ual((htc)(i)), 
0 c”‘d(i)rual((h,,d~c)(i)), 
0 c’(i)-ual((tfc)(i)). 
Each component Cj alternately awaits an input message from inj, performs some 
computation f; and produces an output message on OUtj. We abstract from the 
implementation details of a component; we only consider the following specification: 
Cj sat V i: o&j(i) =f(inj(i)). 
The voter awaits the output of each of the three components, takes a majority vote, 
and outputs the result of that vote. Formally, 
VotersatVi,v: out(i)=v-(3kfl: outk(i)=outl(i)=o). 
Finally, component In conforms to 
In sat V i, j: ini = in(i). 
The voter produces the desired output if at least two of the values output by C1, 
C2 and C3 are correct. Hence, to mask the failure of one component, at most one of 
the values output by C1 , C2 and C3 may be corrupted for each vote. This assumption 
is formalized by the following failure hypothesis: 
car”‘-- = V i: 3k # 1: out,(i) = outi’d A outl(i)= outfd(i) 
Aht~in,,in,,in,}=h,,,t(in,,in2,in,}. 
We show that, given this assumption, the system In (1 ((C, (1 C2 )( C,)<Cor”‘) I( Voter 
produces the desired output, i.e. hiding internal channels we prove 
(ZnI(((C,)(CZI)C3)~C~r$l))( Voter)\(in,,in,,in3,0ut1,0utz,out3} 
sat V i: out(i) =f(in(i)). 
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Proof. By (Parallel composition) 
Cl I( Cl I/ C,sat i Vi: Outj(i)=f(inj(i)). 
j= 1 
By (Failure hypothesis introduction) 
(c1lIc2Ilc3)~co~ G’sat3t: 
( 
i Vi: OUtj(i)=f(it7j(i)) [t/h] 
j= 1 
A Gory/hold], 
which, by definition, is equivalent to 
(C,/IC2(/C3))Cor~‘sat3t: i Vi: outj(i)=f(inf(i)) 
j=l 
AVli: 3k#l: ~~t~(i)=out~(i)Aout,(i)=outf(i) 
and, thus, by (Consequence), 
(C, (1Cz)IC3)~CorS1sat3t: Vi: 3k#l: outk(i)=f(in:(i))Aoutl(i)=f(in~(i)) 
Ahf{in,, inz,in,}=tf(in,,in,,in3). 
Using hf(in,,in,,inJ}=tf{in l,in,,in,} we have that A:=lVi: ttinj(i)=htinj(i). 
Hence, 
(Cl l/C2 I/C,)lCor”satVi: 3kfl: outk(i) =f(inJi)) A outl(i)=f(inl(i)). 
By (Parallel composition), we get 
AVi,j: inj(i)=in(i). 
Hence, by (Consequence), 
In\l((C1 jlC,jlC,)~Cor”‘)satVi: 3k#/: outk(i)=f(in(i))Aoutl(i)=f(in(i)) 
and thus 
In/\((C1 ))C,I/C,)tCorG’)satVi: 3kfl: out,(i)=outl(i)=f(in(i)). 
By (Parallel composition) and (Consequence), we add the voter and obtain the 
relation between in and out: 
InI(((C,(lCzllC3)~Cor~‘)l( I/otersatVi: out(i)=f(in(i)). 
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Finally, by (Hiding), we obtain 
U4l((Cl II C2Il G)\Co@ )]I I/oter)\(in~,in~,in,,out~,0Ut2,0Utj) 
sat Vii: out(i)=f(in(i)). 0 
7. Example II: the alternating hit protocol 
The alternating bit protocol [4], extended with timers, is a simple way of achieving 
communication over a medium that may lose messages. Consider the duplex com- 
munication medium of Fig. 2, where A and M are media with failure hypothesis Loss 
as already discussed in Example 5.8. 
Sender S accepts via in data from the environment, appends a bit to it, and sends it 
via mi,,; the value of the bit alternates for successive messages, tarting with 1. Receiver 
R awaits a message via mout, and sends the bit via a, as an acknowledgement; R only 
passes the data via out to the environment if the value of the message’s bit differs from 
the value of the previous message’s bit, or if it is the first message. Thus, messages 
along M consist of data-bit pairs (d, b), and we define dat ((d, b)) = d and bit((d, b)) = b. 
Medium A transmits bits. Under the alternating bit protocol, S keeps sending 
a message via m, until its acknowledgement arrives via aour. The alternating bit 
ensures that R can identify duplicates. 
In this section we will prove that ABP z S )I (M)lLoss) 1) (AlLoss) 1) R satisfies the 
safety property that Val(h t out)5 Val(h t in). We use the following functions. 
Definition 7.1 (Removal of duplicate messages). For a trace texp recording only 
communications along &an(M), 
0 if texp=( ), 
RDMsg(texpO) if texp = texp: (c, (d, b)) and 
RDMsg(texp)= b = bit(val(last(texp,))), 
RDMsg(texp,,) A (c, (d, b)) if texp = texpt (c, (d, b)) and 
b # bit(uaZ(last(texpo))). 
Fig. 2. Duplex communication medium. 
144 H. Schepers, J. Hooman 
Definition 7.2 (Remoual afduplicute acknowledgements). For a trace texp that records 
only ain and aour communications, 
I 
0 if texp=( ), 
RDAck(texp,) if texp = texp: (c, h) and 
RDAck(texp)= b = val(last(texp0))), 
RDAck(texp,) * (c, b) if texp= texpg (c, b) and 
b # vaf(last(texp,)). 
Definition 7.3 (Sequence of data). For a trace texp recording only communications 
along &an(M), 
Dat(texp) = 0 
if texp= ( ), 
Msg(texpO)^ d if texp= texp{ (c,(d, b)). 
Definition 7.4 (Sequence of bits). For a trace texp that records only m, and 
mnoul communications, 
Bit(texp) = 
0 if texp=( ), 
Bit(texpO) n b if texp = texp: (c, (d, b)). 
In the sequel we write h were we mean hrchan(ABP). 
The informal description of sender S given above can be formalized as follows: 
SsatDat(RDMsg(hTmJ) 5’ Val(hfin) 
A Val(RDAck(hTa,,,)) 5 1 Bit(RDMSg(hTmin)). 
Similarly, we obtain the following specification for receiver R: 
R sat Vat(hTout) 5 1 Dat(RDMsg(h~m,,,)) 
A Val(RDAck(hta,)) _i 1 Bit(RDMsg(hfm,,,)). 
Then, by (Consequence) and (Parallel composition), we obtain 
ABPsat Dat(RDMsg(h~nQ) 3’ Val(htin), (7.1) 
ABPsat P’aI(RDAck(hta,,,)) -<’ Bit(RDMSg(hTmi”)), (74 
ABPsat Val(htout) 5’ Dat(RDMsg(h’Tm,,,)), (7.3) 
ABPsat I/al(RDAck(hTai,)) 5’ Bit(RDMsg(hfm,,,)). (7.4) 
From Example 5.8 we learned that Ml Loss sat Val(htm,,,)l Vul(htmi,), which im- 
plies that 
ABPsat len(RDMsg(htm,,,))dlen(RDMsg(htmi,)). (7.5) 
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Also recall from Example 5.8 that MtLosssat ‘d i: ch(h’(i)) =m,,,-+d(h’(i))= 
u~l(last(h’[iJ~m~,)), with h’=h~{rr~~,,m,,,). Since this property can only be invali- 
dated by communications on ml” and mout, we conclude 
ABPsatVi: ch(h(i))=m,,, -*uUl(h(i))=uUl(Iast(h[i]Tmi,)). (7.6) 
For medium A we similarly obtain 
ABP sat len(RDAck(hT aour)) < len(RDAck(hf ai,)>, 
ABPsatVi: ~h(h(i))=~,,,~~al(h(i))=~al(l~~t(h[iJtai,)). 
The crucial property of the alternating bit protocol is the following. 
(7.7) 
(7.8) 
Lemma 7.5 (Persistency). 
ABP sat Vd(RDAck(h f aOut)) 5’ Vd(RDAck(h f a,,)) 
A Dat(RDMsg(h ~OZ,“,)) 5’ Dat(RDMsg(htmin))* 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Then, by (Consequence), we have 
ABPsat Dat(RDMsg(hfm,,,)) 5’ Dat(RDMsg(hTmi,)), 
which, by (7.1) and (7.3), yields 
ABPsat Vul(htout)5 Vul(hfin), 
which shows that the alternating bit protocol tolerates loss of messages and acknow- 
ledgements. 
8. Soundness and relative network completeness 
In this section we prove that the proof theory of Section 5 is sound; i.e. we prove 
that if a correctness formula FPsat C$ is derivable, then it is valid. Furthermore, we 
prove the proof system to be complete; i.e. we prove that if a correctness formula 
FP sat C$ is valid, then it is derivable. 
Theorem 8.1 (Soundness). The proof system of Section 5 is sound. 
Proof. See Appendix D. 
As usual when proving completeness, we assume that we can prove any valid 
formula of the underlying (trace) logic (cf. [6]). Thus, using t- 4 to denote that 
assertion 4 is derivable, we add the following axiom to our proof theory. 
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Axiom 8.2 (Relative completeness assumption). For an assertion 4, 
A specification of a failure prone process is precise if it characterizes exactly the set 
of behaviours of the process. 
Definition 8.3 (Preciseness). An assertion 4 is precise for failure prone process FP iR 
(i) ]= FP sat 4. 
(ii) If chan(B)~chan(FP) and, for some y, (tI,y)k$, then &.X[FP]. 
(iii) chan(@)Echan(FP). 
As in [28], we use the preciseness preservation property to achieve relative com- 
pleteness. The intuition is that as long as the specifications of the individual processes 
are precise, so are the deduced specifications of systems composed of such processes. 
Let k_Psat Cp denote that correctness formula P sat Cp is derivable. Note that no 
proof rules were given for the sequential aspects of processes, so our notion of 
completeness i relative to the assumption that for a process P there exists a precise 
assertion 4. This leads to the definition of network completeness. 
Definition 8.4 (Network completeness). Assume that for every process P there exists 
a precise assertion C$ with FPsat I$. Then, for any failure prone process FP and 
assertion 5, /= FPsat 4 implies !-FPsat 4. 
The following lemma asserts that preciseness is preserved by the proof rules of 
Section 5. 
Lemma 8.5 (Preciseness preservation). Assume that for any process P there exists an 
assertion 4 which is precisefor P and I-P sat $. Then, for any failure prone process FP, 
there exists an assertion 5 which is precise for FP and +FFPsat 5. 
Proof. See Appendix E. 
The following lemma asserts that any specification satisfied by a failure prone 
process is implied by the precise specification of that process. Since a precise specifica- 
tion only refers to channels of the process, and a valid specification might refer to 
other channels, we have to add a clause expressing that the process does not 
communicate on those other channels. 
Lemma 8.6 (Preciseness consequence). If 4 is precise for FP and ]= FP sat { then 
+(4~ht(chan(C)-chan(FP))=( ))-5. 
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Proof. Assume that 4 is precise for FP and that 
(1) + FP sat {. 
Consider any 0 and y. Assume that 
(2) V&y)+4 A hr(chan(5)-chan(FP))=( >. 
By (2), (0, y) (= 4. Since 4 is precise for FP, chun(+) c chan(FP). Hence, projection 
lemma 4.9(a) yields (Btchan(FP), y) + 4; thus, once more by the preciseness of 4 for 
FP, 8fchan(FP)~X[FP]. By (l), 
(3) (0 7 chun (FP ), Y 1 I= t. 
By (2), we have that (Q,y)J=hf(chun(<)-chan(FP))=( ). Hence, Ot(chun(~)- 
chun(FP))=( ), and thus Bfchun(FP)=Of(chan(FP)u(chun(~)-chun(FP)))= 
~~(chun(FP)uchun(~)). Hence, we obtain from (3) that (13~(chun(FP) u chun(t)), y) )= 
5, and consequently, by projection lemma 4.9(a), (e,y)+<. 0 
Now we can establish relative network completeness. 
Theorem 8.7 (Relative network completeness). The proof system of Section 5 is relu- 
tively network complete. 
Proof. Assume that for every process P there exists a precise specification d with 
kPsat 4. Then, by the preciseness preservation lemma 8.5, for any failure prone 
process FP there exists an assertion iJ which is precise for FP and 
(1) I-FPsat 5. 
Assume k FPsat q. Since (chun(~) - chun(FP))nchun(FP) = 0, we obtain, by (Invariance), 
(2) I-FPsat hT(chun(q)-chun(FP))=( >. 
By (1) and (2), EFP sat 5 A hf(chun(q)- chun(FP))= ( ), and thus, by the precise- 
ness consequence lemma 8.6, the relative completeness assumption, and (Conse- 
quence), t_FPsat y. q 
9. Conclusions and future research 
We have defined a trace-based compositional proof theory for fault tolerant 
distributed systems. In this theory, the failure hypothesis of a process is formalized as 
a relation between the normal and acceptable observable input and output behaviour 
of that process. Such a relation enables one to abstract from the precise nature of 
a fault and to focus on the abnormal behaviour it causes. Comparing our proof system 
with trace-based formalisms for normal behaviour (see e.g. [29]), only one new rule, 
viz. the failure hypothesis introduction rule, has been added to capture acceptable 
executions. We illustrated our method by proving safety of a triple modular redund- 
ant system and the alternating bit protocol, using only the specifications of the 
components. The proof of correctness of the alternating bit protocol that appears in 
[lS] is also based on traces. There, a less natural specification of the receiver, which 
contains the requirement hat nonduplicate input messages have alternating bits, 
evades the necessity of proving the property of persistency. 
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In this paper we only considered safety properties, ignoring liveness issues. Since the 
underlying trace logic is based on finite approximations, the proof theory we pres- 
ented is not appropriate to deal with liveness properties. To allow reasoning about 
liveness properties, trace logic can be replaced by a more expressive logic, e.g. 
temporal logic. Then, instead of relating normal and acceptable communication 
sequences, a failure hypothesis relates normal and acceptable sequences of states. 
Consider, for instance, a system S whose state consists of two integers x and y, i.e. 
STATE,={oIa:jx,y)-N}. A ssume that in a sequence s of states a new state is 
recorded whenever the value of x or y changes. If we allow transient memory faults to 
occur, then it is possible that, instead of some intended sequence s,id = (0, 0), (10, 0), . . . , 
we observe s = (O,O), (3,0), (lO,O), . . because a fault affects the cell containing x before 
it is assigned the value 10. Notice that, since we only allow transient memory faults, 
assigning 10 to x undoes the effect of the preceding fault. In a description where each 
new state is related to its predecessor by stating which state variables have changed, 
transient memory faults can easily be formalized as the insertion of a state at an 
arbitrary position in the sequence. 
Finding a logic to express failure hypotheses more elegantly, e.g. using the classifica- 
tion of failures that appears in [Xl, is a subject of future investigation. Another 
continuation of the research described in this paper is the introduction of time to the 
formalism, to allow reasoning about properties of fault tolerant real-time distributed 
systems. This is investigated in [24], where the finite trace model is replaced by 
a model in which timed infinite traces are decorated with timed refusal sets. The 
extended model enables deadlock to be taken into account. Also, since it consists of 
infinite observations, it allows liveness and fairness issues to be considered. To exclude 
unrealistic behaviour, the extended model incorporates finite variability [3], also 
called non-Zeno-ness (cf. [l]), by guaranteeing that each action has a fixed minimal 
duration. 
Appendix A. Proof of the prefix closedness lemma 4.6 
By induction on the structure of FP. (Base Step) Since %[I’] is a prefix closed set, 
the theorem holds trivially for P. (Induction Step) Assume that the lemma holds for 
X[FP]: 
(a) Assume ~E&[FP~ (/ FP,], i.e. assume that, for i= 1,2, 
8fchUn(FPi)E~uFPia 64.1) 
and 
07 chan(FP, I/ FP2) = 0. (A4 
Consider any 0’50. Since 8’58, we have that, for i= 1,2, B’tchan(FPi)< 
8Tchan(FPi). By (A.1) and the induction hypothesis, we conclude that, for i= 1,2, 
8’fchan(FPi)E%[FFPi]. 64.3) 
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By (A.2), chan(8)c chan(FP, 11 FP*). Since 8’_iB, obviously chan(0’) G than(0). Conse- 
quently, chan(8’)~chan(FP, 11 FP2), which means that 
l9’fchan(FP, 11 FP2)=6’. (A.4) 
From (A.3) and (A.4) we conclude that B’EX’[FP~ (1 FP2J 
(b) Assume &&‘[rFP\cset], i.e. assume there exists a ze&‘([FP] such that 
s\cset = 0. Consider any 0’5 8. There exists a r’<r such that z’\ cset = 8’. By the 
induction hypothesis, ~‘~2’1 FP]. Hence, 8’~S[FP\cset]. 
(c) Assume &%‘[FPtx], . . 1e. assume that there exists a B,EX[FP] such that, for 
all y, (e,, B,y) +x. Consider 8’58. Using y*=(y : h-d’), t fresh, we have (e,,&$)+X. 
Since 0’58, we have (e,, 0, j) k t<h. Consequently, (0,, 8, f) I= x A tsh. By the syn- 
tactic restriction on x, we obtain that (&,, 0, $) + 3told -&,ld: X[t/h, told/hold]. Thus, 
there exists a 6” such that (&, &($I to&@)) + toId <h,,ld A X [t/h, told/&,]. COnSe- 
quently, we have that eye0 and hence (Q,, 8, (y^: toldHen)) l=~[t/h, told/h,,ld]. Then, 
by applying the substitution lemma 4.10, (en, y*(t),(y : told++&‘)) 1=x. Since f(t)=o’ and 
t and toId do not occur in x, we obtain (B”, Q’, y) + x. Since &+%[FPI] and &‘i&, the 
induction hypothesis yields B”E2[FP], which proves e’~%‘[J’;P~~j. 0 
Appendix B. Proof of the composite failure hypothesis lemma 4.8 
Assume ~WWWx1~x2)~, i.e. assume that there exists a tl,,eX’[FP] such that, 
for any y, (~,,Q,Y)/=(x~{x~). By definition this equals (fl,,,O,y)/=lt: ~~[t/h]A 
~~[t/h~~~], i.e. there exists a 0r such that, for f=(y:tt+8,), (8,,8,y*)+X1[t/h]A 
x2 [t/h,,& Observe that r-[rt] (&,, 8, y*)=O,. By the substitution lemma 4.10, 
~e,,e~~~l=~~~ti~lA~~~ti~,~dl iff vw4m=~I and @~A~~I=x~. Hence, 
0eY[FP{(xl<x2)] iff there exists a t&EX[FPIJ such that, for any y, there exists 
a 0r such that (80,81,y)I=x1 and (8,,8,y)I=x2. Then, &Z’[FP{(X~{X~)] iff there 
exists a eldqfqX1j such that (0,,0,y) bx2. Equivalently, O&ff[FP{(~l{~z)] iff 
e~~~(Fpk)kn. 0 
Appendix C. Proof of the persistency lemma 7.5 
By induction on the length of h. 
(Base Step) The case h = ( ) is trivial. 
(Induction Step) Assume that the lemma holds for t, i.e. 
Vul(RDAck(tfu,,,)) 5 l Vul(RDAck(t~ui,)) 
and 
(C.1) 
(C.2) 
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Four cases need examination: 
(a) h = t h (mi,,(V, b)), where b f bit(Uul(last(t t mi,))). By (7.2), we have that 
len(RDAck(kT aout)) <’ len(RDMsg(hT mi,,)). Since t< k, we obtain, by (7.2), 
len(RDAck(tf a,,,))<l len(RDMsg(ttm,)). Then, because k= t” (mi,, (0, b)), we con- 
clude that 
len(RDAck(t~a,,,))= len(RDMsg(ttmi,)). (C.3) 
Since t<k, we have, by (7.4), Vul(RDAck(tTui,))<<_’ Bit(RDMsg(tfm,,,)). Then, by 
(C.l), we obtain that V’ul(RDAck(t~a,,,))~Bit(RDMsg(t rm,,,)). Consequently, we 
have len( P’ul(RDAck( t r a,,,))) < len(Bit(RDMsg(t1 m,,,))), from which we conclude 
that 
h(RDAck(t ~~,~,))<len(RDMsg(t~m,,,)). (C.4) 
By (C.2), we have that len(RDMsg(t tm,,,)) <’ len(RDMsg(t Tmi,,)). Hence, by (C.4), 
we obtain len(RDAck(tra,,,))< len(RDMsg(t tm,,,))b’ len(RDMsg(tfmi,,)). Finally, 
by (C.3), we have len(RDMsg(t ‘fm,,,)) = len(RDMsg(t tmi,)), from which we conclude, 
by (C.2), that Dut(RDMsg(tfm,,,))= Dut(RDMsg(t rmi,,)). Then it is obviously the 
case that Dut(RDMsg(kfm,,,))<’ Dut(RDMsg(krmi,)), from which the lemma fol- 
lows. 
(b) h = t A (mOUt, (v, b)), where bf bir(vul(lust(trm,,,))). Since t< k, we obtain, by 
(7.4), that Vul(RDAck(t 1 ai,))<’ Bit(RDMsg(t 1 mout)). Hence, we conclude that 
Vul(RDAck(t T ui,)) = Bit(RDMsg(t tm,,,)). Then, by (C.l), we obtain that 
Vul(RDAck(t T u,,,))<lBit(RDMsg( t t mour)), from which we can easily conclude that 
len(RDAck(tfu,,,))d’ (len(RDMsg(t~m,,,)). 
Since t<k, we have by (7.2), 
(W 
h(RDAck(tfa,,,))d’ len(RDMsg(ttmi,,)) (C.6) 
and, furthermore, by (7.5), len(RDMsg(t r mout))d len(RDMsg(t r mi,)). Then, by (C.5) 
and (C.6), 
len(RDMsg(ttm,,,))fl len(RDMsg(trmi,,)). (C.7) 
Assume that len(RDMsg(t T mout)) = /en(RDMsg(t r mi,)). Since k = t” (mour, (u, b)), with 
bf bit(vul(lust(tTm,,,))), we obtain len(RDMsg(kfm,,,))=len(RDMsg(kfmin))+ 1, 
which is in conflict with (7.5). Hence, by (C.7), len(RDMsg(tfm..,))<’ 
len(RDMsg(tTmi,)), which, using (C.2), yields that Dut(RDMsg(tfm,,,))i’ 
Dut(RDMsg(tTm.)). By (7.6), c=msg(vul(lust(k[len(k)] Tmi,))) or, equivalently, 
a=msg(vul(lust(tfmi,))). Then, Dut(RDMsg(k~m,,,))=Dut(RDMsg(kTmin)), from 
which we conclude that the lemma holds. 
(c) k= t^ (ui,, b), where b#uul(lust(tfuin)). By (7.4), we have that 
len(RDAck(kfuin))dl len(RDMsg(kTm,,,)). Since t<k, we obtain, by (7.4), 
len(RDAck(cTu,,))<‘len(RDMsg(t~m,,,)). Then, we conclude that 
len(RDAck(tfui,))<‘len(RDMsg(tTm,,,)). ((33) 
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By (C.2) we have that len(RDMsg(tfm,,,))d’/en(RDMsg(tfmin)). Then, by (C.8) we 
conclude that 
len(RDAck(tf ai,))< len(RDMsg(t t mi,)). (C.9) 
Since t<h, we have, by (7.7) len(RDAck(tra,,,))< len(RDAct(tfai,)), which leads, by 
(C.9), to 
len(RDAck(tfa,,,))< len(RDAck(tfui,))< len(RDMsg(tftni,,)). (C. 10) 
Since tih, we have, by (7.2) that len(RDAck(tra,,, ))<‘len(RDMsg(ttmi,)), which, 
by (C.lO), yields that len(RDAck(tfa,,,))= len(RDAck(tfai,,)). Hence, by (C.1) we 
obtain that Vul(RDAck(tT aOut)) = Vul(RDAck(tT a:,)). Then, since h = t A (ui,, b), it is 
obvious that Vul(RDAck(t r a,,,,))<’ Vul(RDAck(t 7 a,,)), from which the lemma 
follows. 
(d) h= t” @tout, b), where bf uul(Iust(tTu,,,)). Since t<h, we have, by (7.2), 
Vul(RDAck(t~U~~~))<‘Bit(RDMsg(tfmi~)). Hence, we conclude that 
Vul(RDAck(tfa,,,))<‘Bit(RDMsg(t~mi,)), f rom which we can deduce that 
len(RDAck(tfu,,,))<‘len(RDMsg(tftni,,)). (C.11) 
By (C.2), we have that len(RDMsg(t t mout)) d1 len(RDMsg(t r tni,,)). Then, by (C. 1 l), we 
conclude 
len(RDAck(tTu,,,))d’len(RDMsg(t~m,,,)). 
Since t<h, we have, by (7.4) 
(C.12) 
len(RDAck(tTU,))<‘len(RDMsg(t~m,,,)) (C.13) 
and, furthermore, by (7.7), len(RDAck(ttu,,,)) < len(RDAck(ttui,J). Then, by (C.12) 
and (C.13), we conclude 
len(RDAck(t~u,,,))<‘len(RDAck(t~u,,)). (C. 14) 
Assume that len(RDAck(t ?a,,,,)) = len(RDAck(tf ui,)). Then, since h = t” (aout, b), 
where b #vul(lust(tfu,,,)), we obtain len(RDAck(hf~,,,))=len(RDAck(hfu~,))+ 1, 
which conflicts with (7.7). Consequently, by (C.14) [en(RDAck(t tu,,,))<’ 
len(RDAck(t r a;,)), which, combined with (C. l), yields Vul(RDAck(t ?a,,,))<’ 
Val(RDAck(tt ain)). Finally, since, by (7.8) we have that b = ual(lust(h[ len(h)] tui,)) 
or, equivalently, b = uul(lust(t~u,,)), we obtain Vul(RDAck(hfu,,,)) = Vul(RDAck 
(hTui”))> from which we conclude that the lemma holds. q 
Appendix D. Proof of the soundness theorem 8.1 
D.I. Soundness of the consequence and conjunction rules 
Trivial. q 
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0.2. Soundness of the invariance rule 
Follows from the fact that if BEX[FP] then chan(O)Gckan(FP), Thus, 
csetnckan(FP) = 8 implies ckan(Q)ncset = 0. 0 
0.3. Soundness of the parallel composition rule 
Suppose 
(D.1) 
Assume 
I=FP,sat@,, /=FP,sat4,. 03.2) 
We have to prove + FP, // FP, sat cjl A c#J~. Consider any y. Let 0~~6 i[ FP, 11 FP,] . By 
the definition of the semantics, we have, for i= 1,2, I~~~~~~(FP,)EZ[FP,I] and 
Bfchan(FP, 11 FP,)=0. Since Otchan(FP,)EA?[FP,], we obtain, by (D.2), 
(OTchan(FPi),y) i=$i. By projection lemma 4.9(a) ((Qtckan(FPi))~ckan(+i),y)l=&i; 
thus (Ot(ckan(FPi)nckan(4i)),Y) j= 4i. 
By (D.l), we obtain that ckan(FP,)nckan(~I)~ckan(FPI)nckan(~,), from which 
we conclude that (ckan(FPz)nckan(~,))u(ckan(FP1)nckan(~,))~ckan(FP,)n 
ckan(4,). Consequently, we have that (ckan(FP,)nckan(+,))u(ckan(FP1)n 
ckan(~I))=ckan(FPI)nckan(@I), from which we deduce ckan(FP,)nckan(41)= 
(ckan(FP1)uckan(FP,))nckan(cjl)=ckan(FP1 I/ FP2)nckan(41). By similar reason- 
ing, ckan(FPz)nckan(42)= ckan(FP, (/ FP2)nckan($,). Consequently, for i = 1,2, 
(Q(ckan(FPI II Ff’zbch4#i)), y) k 4i. H en=, (QtkhaWP1 II Ff’~))fchan(d4,1~) I= 
4i, which leads to (et ckan(cji), y) I= #iy and consequently, by projection lemma 4.9(a), 
(O,Y)(=~~. This proves (=FPJIFP,sat$,A~,. q 
0.4. Soundness of the hiding rule 
Assume 
and 
)= FP sat cj 
ckan( 4)ncset =0. 
(D.3) 
(D.4) 
We show FP\cset sat I#L Consider any y. Let BEH[FP\cset]. Then there exists 
a Q,EZ[FP] with 8=01 \cset. By (D.3), (8,,y)+4. Since, by (D.4) 
chum+) c CHAN --set, projection lemma 4.9(a) leads to (0, T(CHAN-cset), y) I= 4, 
and consequently, by definition, (Or\cset, y) I= 4. Hence, (0, y) (= 4. 0 
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D.5. Soundness of the failure hypothesis introduction rule 
Assume 
kFPsat$. (D.5) 
Consider any y. Let ~EJ?[FP~x]. Then there exists a B,EZ[FPIJ such that, for all y, 
((I,, 8, y) 1=x. By (D.5), for any 19;, (&,, 8,,, y) k 4; thus also (&, &,, y) /= 4. Let, for fresh 
t, y*=(y : tH&). Since t does not occur in 4, (0,, 0,,$) I=$. Observe that 
f[t](O,,O,f)=&; thus (e,,s[Itn(e,,e,y”),y*)~=. By substitution lemma 4.10(a) we 
obtain (e,, 8, y*) b $J [t/h], i.e. by correspondence lemma 4.4, we have 
(e>~)l=~Ct/hl. (D.6) 
Since (0,, 8, $) b x, we have (S[ t] (e,, 8, y^), 8, y^) (=x. Applying substitution lemma 
4.10(b) leads to (e,, 8, 9) I= X[t/hJ. Since hold does not occur in X[t/hold], corres- 
pondence lemma 4.4 leads to 
(D.7) 
From (D.6) and (D.7) we obtain (&(y: n-+0,)) I=+[t/h] A~[t/h~,~], from which we 
may conclude that (0, y) I= 3: 4 [t/h] A x[t/hold]. 0 
Appendix E. Proof of the preciseness preservation lemma 8.5 
By induction on the structure of FP. (Base Step) By assumption, the lemma holds 
for P. (Induction Step) Assume that the lemma holds for FP: 
(a) Assume kFP1 sat 41 and kFP, sat $2, with 4r and & precise for FP1 and FP,, 
respectively. Since, by the preciseness of 41 for FP1, we have 
chan($,)cchan(FP,) (E.1) 
we conclude chan(~l)nchan(FPZ)~chan(FP,)nchan(FP,)~chan(FP1). Similarly, 
using 
chan(q5,)cchan(FP2), 03.2) 
we obtain chan(&)nchan(FP1)zchan(FP2). Thus, by applying (Parallel composi- 
tion), we obtain 
(E.3) 
We show that 41 A 42 is precise for FP, (( FP2. 
(i) By (E.3) and soundness, we obtain + FP1 (I FP2 sat qSl A c#I~. 
(ii) Let 
chan(O)cchan(FP, II FP,), (E.4) 
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and assume (Q,y)+d, A4,. Then, by (E.l) and projection lemma 4.9(a), 
(etchan(FP,),y)I=~,. Consequently, by preciseness of 41 for FP1, we conclude 
8tchan(FP1)E3?[FFP,~. (E.5) 
Similarly, 
eTchan(FP,)EX”[IFP2J. (E.6) 
Finally, by (E.4), 
0 1 chan(FP, 1) FP2) = 0. 05.7) 
Then, by (ES-(E.7), we conclude that &%‘[FP1 (1 FP2j. 
(iii) By (E.l) and (E.2), we conclude chan(~l)uchan(~,)~chan(FP,)uchan(FP,). 
Hence, by definition, we have chun(~ 1 A +2) E chan(FP, /( FP,). 
(b) Assume 
I-FP sat C#J 
with 4 precise for FP. Define 
&t: (p[t/h]Ahf(chan(FP)-cset)=t~(chun(FP)-cset). 
We show that kFP\cset sat 4 and, furthermore, that 6 is precise for FP\cset. 
(E.8) 
Lemma E.1. +4-6. 
Proof. Assume that (0, y) l= 4. Let, for fresh t, y* =(y : u-49). Then, we have (0, f) I= 4 
and, trivially, (0, 9) I= Q, [t/h] A h r (chan(FP) - cset) = t t (chun(FP) - cset). Hence, we 
may conclude (0, y) I= 3: $[t/h] A h~(chun(FP)-met)= t ~(chun(FP)-met). 0 
By Lemma E.l and the relative completeness assumption, E4-6. By (ES) and the 
consequence rule, I-FPsat& Notice that chun(3t: @[t/h])=@; thus &an($)= 
chun(FP) -met, and hence chun($)ncset =$!I. Then, the hiding rule leads to 
tFP\cset sat 6. (E.9) 
It remains to be shown that 6 is precise for FP\cset. 
(i) By (E.9) and soundness, we have )= FP\cset sat 3. 
(ii) Let 
chun(O)Gchun(FP\cset) 
and, for some y, (e, y) I= 6. There exists a $ with 
(E. 10) 
(e,(y : td)) I= $[t/h] A ht (chun(FP)-cset)= tl(chun(FP)-cset). (E.11) 
Then, by substitution lemma 4.10(a), ($,(y : tw8)) +q5, and thus (8,~) I=4. Hence, by 
projection lemma 4.9(a), we have (07 chun(4), y) (= 4. Since, by the preciseness of 4 for 
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FP, chant z chan(FP), we obtain (et chan(FP), y) + 4. Obviously, chan( e^t 
chan(FP))~chan(FP), so, by the preciseness of 4 for FP, we have that 
~~chan(FP)~~[FP]. Since, by (E.lO), chan(8)cchan(FP)-ccset and, by (E.l l), 
Bf(chan(FP)-cset) = e^t(chan(FP) -met), we obtain 0 = ~~chan(FP\cset), and thus 
tI=(~~chan(FP))\cset. Hence, &X’[FP\csetJ. 
(iii) Since chan(&) = chan(FP) - cset, we have, by definition, chan(&) = 
chan(FP\ cset). 
(c) Assume 
kFP sat 4 
with 4 precise for FP. Define 6~ 42x, i.e. 
(E.12) 
Then, by (Failure hypothesis introduction), 
I-FP<xsat 4. 
We show that 6 is precise for FPjx. 
(i) By (E.13) and soundness, we have k FP{X sat 4. 
(ii) Let 
(E. 13) 
chun(8) E chun(FP~~) (E.14) 
and assume that, for some y, (0, y) I= 6. Consequently, there exists a trace 6 such that 
(E.15) 
Then, by substitution lemma 4.10(a), (e,(y : t++8))+4, and thus, since t does not 
occur free in 4, (O,Y)+~. Since we have, by the preciseness of 4 for FP, 
chun(~)~chun(_FP), we obtain, by projection lemma 4.9(a), (e^tchan(FP), y) I=& 
Trivially, chan(8 7 chun(FP)) c chun(FP), and hence, because of the preciseness of 4 for 
PP, 
i~chun(FP)&‘[FP]. (E.16) 
By correspondence lemma 4.4 and substitution lemma 4.10(b), (E.15) leads to 
(g, 8,(y: t&))I=x; thus, since t does not occur free in x, (8, (3,~) 1=x. Since 
chun(~)~chun(FP), projection lemma 4.9(b) leads to 
ca ch@FP), 0, Y) I= x. (E. 17) 
Finally, by definition, (E.14) leads to 
chun(B) G chan(FP). 
Consequently, by (E.16)-(E.18), e~%[FP?xj. 
(iii) By definition, we have that 
chun(~)=chun(~[t/h])uchun(~[t/h,,~]). 
(E.18) 
(E.19) 
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Clearly, 
chan(X[t/ho,dl)Echan(X). (E.20) 
It is also obvious that chan( 4 [t/h]) G chati( and, since, by the preciseness of 4 for 
FP, we have that chan($)~chan(FP), we conclude 
(E.21) 
By (E.19)-(E.21), chan(~)~chan(FP)uchan(~), i.e. chan(~)cchan(FP~~). Cl 
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